where Q + + is described by 81, Q2, Q3' and w Ily:-a,!'ll<r,. i=1,2;..,n 95' llz:+u,!'l/<ri, i = 1 , 2 ; . . . n .
m i n { Y ( l + 5 ) -z ( l -~) : ( Y , z ) E Q }
where9isdescribedbyy>O;z>O;y+r=1;and Simplifying. we obtain We conclude that (S) is robust if and only if ~5 , s~€ { ( 5 : , 6 '~: 5 ' > 1 , 6 ' > 2 } U { ( 5 : . 6~) : 0~6 ' < 2 ,~> 6 ' / 2 } .
In general. we may wish to include a solurion restraint set, X,, a proper subset of X. Consequently. the definition of robustness can be modified by adding the restriction "xoEXc. " In [5], the notion of robustness is interpreted within the context of uncertain dynamical control systems. Loosely speaking, this is acccmplished by identifying x , A,. and B, above with inpur, model uncerlainp and targer ser. respectively. 
Two General Properties of the Saddle-Point Solutions of Dynamic Games

TAMER BAsAR
Abstract-In deterministic team problems every closed-loop representation of an optimal open-loop solution is also optimal. This property, however, no longer holds true when the optimization problem is a zero-sum or a nonzero-sum game. In zero-sum games, two weaker (but still general enough) versions of this statement are valid, which still Sail to hold in the caw of nonzero-sum games. In this correspondence we state and prove these two general properties of the saddle-point solution in dynamic games. This completes the proof of the theorem.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We take the solution set correspondence, we verify two general properties of the saddle-point solution that are shared in common with team solutions, but not with Nash solutions. These results illuminate the close link between any two saddle-point solutions of a ZSDG, obtained under different information patterns.
In the sequel we first give a general formulation of the ZSDG and then make precise the concept of representation of a strategy pair under different infomation patterns. We state and prove two main features of the saddle-point solution in Section 111, and discuss these properties in Section IV.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
The class of zerc-sum dynamic games (ZSDG) under consideration will be characterized by 1) a general difference equation describing the evolution of the state in discrete time x n + l = f n ( x n .~n , %~> %given,
and 2) a general cost functional
In this formulation, u, and on represent the control vectors of the minimizer (Player 1) and the maximizer (Player 2), respectively, at the time step n, and are of dimensions rl and rz-x, is the state vector of dimension rn, andf,, $ZN(.). and $Z, (. ; ; ) are Borel-measurable functions defined on appropriate dimensional spaces.
At every stage of the game, each player will have access to perfect information about the present and/or past values of the state vector, which we denote by qi(n) for Player i at stage n. In this correspondence our interest lies primarily on three different kinds of information patterns for each player, namely 
The second of these is also known as the pure-fe&k information pattern.
To delineate the class of admissible control strategies for each player, we first note that each information pattern qi(n) generates an information space Zi(n) as a subset of an appropriate dimensional Euclidean space. For Player i and for each information pattern 1)-3), we denote this subset respectively by Z:(n), Z{(n), and Z t ( n ) . It should be clear that Z:(n) is actually independent of n and that the dimension of Z{(n) is also independent of n, whereas the dimension of Z t ( n ) increases as n does. To be more precise, Z:(n)c Rm, Z!(n)c R", Z,"(n)c R"'", V n = O,.. e , N -1. Now, we define e(.), r{(n), and c(n) to be the spaces of all Borel-measurable functions mapping, respectively, Z:(n), Z!(n), and Z;(n) into R Q . Each of these newly defined spaces w i l l be called the admissible strategy space of Player i at stage n under the corresponding information pattern. Denoting the control strategy of Player i at stage n by, yh, we let be the N-tuple product space such that y i = ( y~y , ! l ,~~~, y~!~n -I~i s i n~i f a n d o n l y i f y i n~~( n ) , V n = O ,~~~, N -1. We define the prqduct strategy spaces r ! and c analogously.
Definition I :
A pair (yF,y9 is said to be an OLOL s d e -p o i n t pair for the ZSDG under consideration if the following saddle-point inequality is satisfied for yI E e, yz E e:
Similar definitions apply to CLCL, CLNM-CLNM saddle-point solutions and to all such permutations of OL, CL, and CLNM.
For eve7 pair (ul Eq,yzEPJ, we now let Zn(yl,y> denote the value of x" in terms of the initial state x . and let X"(yl.yz) denote the value of x" in terms of the initial state x@ which are determined uniquely and recursively as follows (where we suppress the functional dependence on y1 and yz for convenience): and some of these could he saddle-point pairs.
IV. CERTAIN COMMENTS AND DISCUSSIOS
The two properties of the saddle-point solution. that we have outlined in Propositions 1 and 2, are also shared in common with optimal (team) solutions of two-person dynamic team problems. Moreover, it is wellknown that for dynamic team problems, the statements of Propositions 1 and 2 can actually be made stronger. For the Nash solutions of nonzero-sum games, however, none of these properties remain valid (see for example [I] , [3n. Hence, we can say that Propositions 1 and 2 provide two properties of saddle-point solutions, that are shared in common with team solutions but not with Nash solutions.
